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We test the theoretical prediction that profit sharing reduces worker separations and by doing so 
increases the incidence of training.  Using individual level UK data, we confirm that profit 
sharing is a robust determinant of lower separation rates and of greater training incidence.   
Critically, we cannot confirm the predicted link between separations and training.  Instead, the 
evidence supports alternative theories suggesting a direct link between profit sharing and training. 
Our results suggest that profit sharing changes employer-worker relations in a way that leads to 
greater formal and informal investment in worker skills but that this is independent of its 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Profit sharing has been shown to be associated with higher firm profitability, labor productivity 
and worker wages (Bhargara 1994, Cable and Wilson 1989, Estrin et al. 1997, Hubler 1993, 
Kruse 1992, Wadhwani and Wall 1990).  While the expectation that linking pay and performance 
will increase worker productivity stands at the center of personnel economics, the causation in the 
case of profit sharing remains less obvious.  The recognized 1/N problem suggests that free riding 
dramatically limits the effectiveness of profit sharing as a direct incentive device to elicit greater 
effort. While particular technologies or forms of group behavior can help reduce the 1/N problem 
(Fitzroy and Kraft 1987 and Adams 2006), there exists a largely alternative causation that has not 
received sufficient attention. Profit sharing changes employment relations so as to create greater 
investment in worker training and it is this training that improves productivity. 
 
We pursue this second line of causation reviewing variations from the theoretical literature 
suggesting that profit sharing spurs training.  We contrast two broad strands within this second 
line of reasoning.  First, profit sharing reduces the likelihood of separations between workers and 
the firm.  This reduced turnover increases the expected amortization period for investments in 
training that, in turn, increases the likelihood of training. Thus, profit sharing plays an indirect 
role on training through its influence on separations (Azfar and Danninger 2001). Second, profit 
sharing plays a direct role on training either by creating a contract that rewards the training by 
reducing fears of a hold-up problem and/or by encouraging co-workers to provide training. We 
are the first to investigate which of these two strands is predominant and to incorporate the roles 
of types of performance pay beyond profit sharing. 
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We use two separate data sources to present detailed UK individual level hazard estimates of the 
probability of separation showing it to be lower in the presence of profit sharing.  We also 
demonstrate that this result remains robust to a wide set of alternative specifications including 
using panel data to hold worker fixed-effects constant, using alternative controls for tenure and 
jointly estimating the provision of training and separation risk.  Further, we confirm that profit 
sharing stands as an important determinant of both the probability of receiving training and of its 
intensity.  While these results would seem to support the view that profit sharing influences 
training through its influence on separation, we cannot confirm this despite numerous attempts at 
simultaneous estimation.  Instead, we find that the influence of separation probabilities on 
training is typically absent, or even perversely positive.  Yet, even as the predicted separation 
probability is included and fails to play a role, profit sharing continues to be positively associated 
with training.   
 
Thus, using a wide range of testing strategies, we confirm that profit sharing positively influences 
training and that it appears to do so directly rather than indirectly through its influence on the 
probability of separation.  In addition, we show that individual performance pay plays virtually 
no role in determining separations but plays a largely similar role in determining training.  This 
casts further doubt on the existence of an indirect role for profit sharing through its influence on 
separations and speaks to the importance of a contract that rewards the productivity growth 
caused by training.  At the same time, we have a unique indicator of informal training reflecting 
circumstances in which co-workers are crucial. Consistent with the second direct effect, profit 
sharing stands as a significant positive determinant of such training. Finally, individual 
performance related pay schemes are demonstrated to have no such effect on informal training by    3
co-workers.  Thus, by contrasting profit sharing and alternative performance pay schemes, we 
present further support for both of the predicted direct causation paths between profit sharing and 
training. 
 
The next section presents the theory suggesting that profit sharing enhances productivity with a 
special emphasis on the role of training.  It reviews past evidence which indicates the value added 
by using new data from a country not yet examined and the critical need for a new testing 
strategy.  The third section reviews our data and the methods used.  The fourth section presents 
the evidence on the association between profit sharing and job separation while the fifth section 
presents the initial evidence on the association between profit sharing and training.  The sixth 
section summarizes our estimates that allow for both direct effects of profit sharing and indirect 
effect through reduced turnover. A final section concludes. 
 
2. PROFIT SHARING PRODUCTIVITY AND TRAINING 
 
At its simplest, profit sharing aligns the interests of workers with those of owners leading 
employees to work harder or smarter. There is evidence that workers under profit sharing 
arrangements have reduced absence rates.
1 In addition there is evidence of a correlation between 
labor productivity and profit sharing (Kruse 1992, 1993 and Estrin et al. 1997).  Yet, the 
causation is not as straightforward as it may first appear once one recognizes that the "incentive 
for effort" argument is undermined by the well-recognized 1/N problem.  Highly interdependent 
worker productivities may reduce the power of the associated free riding (Adams 2006 and 
Heywood and Jirjahn 2006) as may strong horizontal peer monitoring (FitzRoy and Kraft 1987).  
                                                 
1See Wilson and Peel (1991) for evidence from the United Kingdom, Brown et al. (1999) for evidence from France, 
Chelius and Smith for evidence from the United States and Heywood and Jirjahn (2004) for evidence from Germany.    4
Also, discontinuous incentives that require a certain profitability to be achieved before there is 
any profit sharing payments can alleviate free riding (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987 and Petersen 
1992). Yet, these take on the characteristics of special cases needed to overcome the more 
general free-riding problem implied by such a broad group reward as profit sharing.   
 
Parent (2004) takes the influence of profit sharing on productivity as given, but presents evidence 
that it does not occur by eliciting extra effort.  He shows that those workers who received profit 
sharing on a previous job receive higher wages on their current job.  This he claims is unlikely in 
a model of eliciting effort but fits with the alternative conjecture that profit sharing is associated 
with greater investment in skills and that these skills stand at the base of improved productivity.  
It also suggests that at least a portion of the skills acquired due to the influence of profit sharing 
may be general and thus of value to later employers. 
 
There exist at least three variations in the literature as to why profit sharing may increase training 
and so influence worker productivity.  The first emphasizes the importance of profit sharing on 
separations and we label this a model of indirect causation as it suggests that the reduced 
separations are ultimately responsible for the greater incidence of training and so the higher 
productivity.  The second two variations are largely unrelated to separation and we label these 
models of direct causation.  Among our major objectives, we will distinguish empirically 
between the direct and indirect models. 
 
Profit sharing may reduce employee separations encouraging investment in firm specific capital 
as the expected amortization period for such investments grows. Kruse (1992) argues that 
workers may reduce their initiated separations because profit sharing "leads to greater    5
identification with the firm" and because workers may value the stronger link between 
compensation and effort implied by profit sharing.  At the same time, firms may reduce their 
initiated separations because profit sharing reduces the marginal cost of labor during periods of 
weak firm performance making redundancy less likely (Weitzman 1984).  The existing evidence 
on the relationship between profit sharing and separation is mixed.  D'Art and Turner (2004) fail 
to find any influence of profit sharing on separation in their large survey of firms in 11 European 
countries.  Chelius and Smith (1990) found only "borderline" evidence in earlier US data 
claiming it was at best "suggestive." These studies contrast with the more recent US individual 
level estimations of Azfar and Danninger (2001) showing a strong negative influence of profit 
sharing on the probability of a worker being made redundant and also showing a negative 
influence of profit sharing on the probability of a worker quitting.
2  
 
Azfar and Danninger (2001) combine their evidence that profit sharing reduces separations with 
similarly strong evidence that profit sharing is associated with increased training.   They show 
that workers with profit sharing were 25 percent more like to receive training and that when 
trained, they received significantly more training as well.  They argue that the combined findings 
that profit sharing reduces separations and that it increases training "support our hypothesis that 
greater job stability increases investment in firm-specific training."   (Azfar and Danninger 2001, 
p. 626)  
 
While recognizing the importance of these findings, the pattern of indirect causation between 
profit sharing and training relies upon a strong link between the likelihood of separation and 
                                                 
2 Arranz-Aprete (2005) uses individual data from Finland confirming the negative influence of profit sharing on 
turnover. Earlier work by Kraft (1991) confirms that profit sharing decreases the number of dismissals while Kruse 
(1991) used more aggregate data showing that profit sharing firms had smaller employment decreases during 
economic downturns.    6
training. Although longer expected tenure is taken as a basic determinant of training (Lynch 
1991, 1993), the influence of reduced separation probabilities on training may not be large if firm 
specific training is actually rare, as indicated by Lowenstein and Spletzer (1999), and most 
periods of unemployment following separation are short or non-existent. Thus, Royalty (1996) 
estimates the influence of predicted separation probabilities on the incidence of employer-
provided training.  She finds that the probability of "job to job" separation (the majority of 
separations for men) has no influence on training and that only the probability of "job to non-
employment" separation has a negative influence. This confirms the importance of expected 
employment duration not expected tenure duration. Veum (1997) finds a positive association 
between training off-the-job and worker separation and, at best, a weak negative association 
between employer-provided training and separation. Levine (1993) finds no evidence that plants 
that provide greater training have lower turnover rates and Sieben (2005) finds evidence from 
European survey data that periods of general training actually trigger increased job search 
behavior. Using UK data Green et al (2000) find no relationship between training and mobility.  
In short, researchers interested in the influence of profit sharing on training should not take for 
granted that a reduced probability of separation necessarily increases training.  There may, 
instead, be a direct link with profit sharing. Two channels have been suggested in the literature 
explaining how profit sharing may directly increase training. 
 
 
First, profit sharing has been seen as an explicit contract that helps alleviate the well-known 
"hold-up problem" associated with investments in firm specific training (FitzRoy and Kraft 
1987). Firm specific skills are inherently difficult to contract upon and because they have no 
market value, firms cannot be trusted to share the rents over those skills without resort to strong    7
reputation effects.  Moreover, even for general training, workers may fear a hold-up problem 
from their current employer if it is costly or time consuming to find alternative employment. 
Thus, "by writing a contract in which it is specified that workers get a certain percentage of 
profits, workers can feel more confident that they will not be held up ex post (Parent 2004: 38)." 
Thus, workers under profit sharing arrangements may choose to devote more time investing in 
skills.  Interestingly, this function might well be played by alternative performance pay schemes 
that allow workers to capture returns on their investment in training and improved performance 
(Kraft 1991).  As a result, we will examine the role of both profit sharing and individual 
performance pay throughout our analysis.  In either case, it is the explicit contract that rewards 
increased productivity that causes the investment not an indirect influence through a decreased 
risk of separation. 
 
Second, profit sharing has been seen as directly encouraging "helping effort" in which workers 
allocate effort not only to their own tasks but also to assisting with the tasks of coworkers (Itoh 
1991).  Profit sharing thus helps reduce the confirmed tendency under individual incentives of 
ignoring the profitable allocation of effort to helping coworkers (Drago and Garvey 1996).   
Critically, training has very large elements of helping effort.  Co-workers provide a large share of 
both formal and informal on-the-job training and do so by taking time away from other duties 
(Barron et al. 1989).   The time and effort workers spend training co-workers has been thought to 
depend on the incentives they face.  Profit sharing reduces the tendency to under-provide training 
effort.  Indeed, Morrison and Wilhelm (2004) emphasize the role played by co-worker training in 
professional service firms (such law firms) arguing that partnership arrangements in which the 
trained workers retain a share of profit are critical to ensuring that the appropriate degree of 
training is provided to new hires.  Similarly, Encinosa et al. (2007) find that U.S. doctors    8
receiving a share of firm profits rather than receiving earnings based on their individual 
contributions are more likely to consult with one another about cases and provide their expertise 
to colleagues. Thus, in this view profit sharing increases the incentive for informal and on-the-job 
training by co-workers and supervisors who might otherwise emphasize their own tasks.  In this 
case, individual performance pay should work in the opposite direction as profit sharing.  Explicit 
rewards for workers' own productivity should be at odds with helping and training newer hires as 
the diverted time increases overall productivity but not in ways rewarded by an individual based 
scheme. 
 
We present estimates using UK data on profit sharing as a determinant of individual worker 
separations. Using two UK data sets and controlling for alternative performance pay schemes 
beyond profit sharing, we confirm a robust role for profit sharing in reducing separations for male 
employees.  We show that profit sharing is associated with greater likelihood and intensity of 
training but we fail to find evidence for the hypothesized indirect causation through reduced 





We use two longitudinal data sets from the UK that sample very similar populations in similar 
time frames, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the 5 quarter longitudinal version 
of the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). The BHPS is an annual longitudinal survey from 1991 to 
2004. The longitudinal version of the LFS we use has been running since 1992 and comprises a 
five quarter rolling panel where each quarter a new cohort is observed. For both data sets, we 
limit our sample to male employees aged 20-65 who were not employed in the public sector.     9
  
We use these two data sets as each has off-setting strengths with respect to payment method 
information. The chief advantage of the LFS is its detailed measures of payment methods. From 
1999 onwards, individuals record separately if they received tips, piece rates, bonuses, profit 
shares and a variety of compensatory wages (locality allowances, shift allowances etc).
3 
However, payment information is only available in the LFS for the first and last quarter that the 
individual is observed. Hence, for our purposes, it has only a limited panel dimension. The 
information on payment schemes in the BHPS is available for 1998 onwards and the questions 
asked are, "In the last 12 months have you received any bonuses such as a Christmas or quarterly 
bonus, profit-related pay or profit sharing bonus, or an occasional commission?", this excludes 
overtime payments; and "Does your pay include performance related pay" (Taylor et al, 2006).  
Hence the categorization of profit share receipt in the BHPS is broad.  A key difference between 
the two data sets is the time domain that the payment method questions cover. For the BHPS, 
these relate to payments made in the last year. Due to the quarterly nature of the LFS, payment 
method information is effectively for the previous 13 weeks.  
 
Both data sets allow the disaggregation of job separations into a number of categories, including 
quits, fires and redundancies. We observe job separations in the year following the observation of 
pay type. For the BHPS we have a panel of separations of up to 8 years, whereas with the 
structure of the LFS we effectively only observe one year of separation data on each individual. 
 
Training information is quite detailed in the BHPS, and has been extensively used by researchers 
in the past (see for instance Arulampalam and Booth (1998) and Booth and Bryan (2006)). We 
                                                 
3 We group tips and piece rates into one category (performance pay).     10
focus on the incidence and intensity of employer funded training, general training and specific 
training. The LFS contains less detailed information on training, and much of this is only 
available for certain subsets of the data. However, unlike the BHPS, it has an explicit question on 
the incidence of informal on-the-job training. We use this to examine the role of profit shares on 
helping effort. 
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the two data sets. In the BHPS roughly 42 percent of our 
sample report receiving a "profit share or bonus" in the past year and 19 percent report some form 
of performance pay. The more detailed pay scheme rates in the LFS appear somewhat lower; 
however recall that these are reported rates of payment in the past quarter. If these rates are 
roughly annualized, then profit share/bonuses are received by approximately 39 percent of male 
non-public sector employees. Whether the receipt of performance related pay is of a comparable 
level is dependant on how respondents in the BHPS viewed payments classified as compensatory 
wages and the other additional payments listed in the LFS. Otherwise the two samples appear 
roughly comparable, although there are slight variations by age and hours worked. Log weekly 
pay rates are noticeably lower in the LFS.  
 
4. RESULTS: THE DETERMINANTS OF SEPARATION  
 
Probit estimates of the risk of job separation are reported in Table 2 and Table 3 for the BHPS 
and LFS, respectively. For ease of interpretation we report marginal effects. We present overall 
estimates of separation and subsequent estimates disaggregated by quits, fires and redundancies 
(a subset of fires). Initially, risk of separation is estimated across the pooled sample for the BHPS 
with standard errors clustered at the individual level. Both data sets present clear evidence that    11
the receipt of profit sharing is associated with a lower risk of separation. Furthermore, profit 
sharing appears to be associated with both lower incidence of employee initiated separations 
(quits), employer initiated separations (fires) and redundancy. Such systematic effects are not 
observed for other performance pay and there is even some evidence that other performance pay 
types are associated with a higher risk of separation.  
 
Greater tenure may simply reflect a lower probability of separation. This mechanical relationship 
may over-control the determinants of separation allowing misleading results to emerge. As a 
robustness check, Appendix Table A1 demonstrates that the reported effects of profit sharing on 
turnover are robust to the omission of tenure, which in a pre-sorted sample such as the BHPS and 
LFS is likely to be endogenously related to separation risk. 
 
It has been suggested that any observed relationship between profit shares and job turnover may 
simply reflect the sorting of individuals by unobservable characteristics. As one illustration, 
workers who form strong bonds with co-workers may both sort into employers using profit 
sharing and be less likely to quit (Heywood et al. 2005). To investigate this and related 
possibilities, we re-estimate the models of overall separations for the BHPS where we utilize a 
fixed effects logit estimator in an attempt to control for unobserved individual level 
heterogeneity.
4 The results from this model are reported in table 4. This demonstrates that the 
sign and magnitude of profit sharing effects on separations are robust to the inclusion of 
individual level fixed effects.   
                                                 
4 Two related problems emerge because the fixed effects logit estimator excludes observations with no variation in 
the dependent variable. First, the smaller sample size makes it difficult to gain efficient fixed effects estimates for the 
separation sub-categories.  Second, the resulting sample may not be fully representative. We note that alternative 
fixed effects linear probability models yield profit share effects very similar in magnitude and significance to those 
reported in table 4. These estimates, and fixed effects logit estimates for the separation sub-categories, are available 
from the authors upon request.    12
 
5. RESULTS: THE DETERMINANTS OF TRAINING 
 
Table 5 provides probit estimates of the impact of profit sharing on training incidence with 
standard errors clustered at the individual level. The estimates are reported for overall training 
incidence, along with the incidence of employer funded training, general training and specific 
training. Such a detailed level of disaggregation is not possible in the LFS, so reported estimates 
are from the BHPS. Nonetheless, estimates of the influence of payment method on overall 
training incidence from the LFS are reported as appendix A2.  All control variables are as 
reported in table 2 and 3, respectively, but for brevity only the estimated payment method effects 
are reported.  
The estimates of overall training incidence in table 5 and appendix Table A2 demonstrate 
that the receipt of profit sharing stands as a positive determinant of the incidence of training.  The 
estimates for the disaggregated training incidence models also suggest a positive association 
between profit share receipt and the receipt of employer-funded training, specific training and 
general training. The magnitudes of these effects are roughly similar. Furthermore, evidence from 
the LFS indicates that profit sharing is positively associated with a higher incidence of informal 
on-the-job training (Column 5, Table A2), an effect that is not evident for performance pay. 
When combined with our inability to find a role for reduced separation probability on training 
(see section 6), this finding is consistent with the notion that profit sharing increases helping 
effort and so training within the workplace. 
The estimated association between training and profit shares may merely signal that 
individuals who have higher unobservable propensity to train may sort into workplaces with    13
profit sharing arrangements. We investigate this by again controlling for individual specific 
unobservable characteristics by re-estimating the model of overall training incidence via fixed 
effects logit.
5 These estimates are reported in table 6. These retain the same signs to those 
reported in table 5, although the effect of profit sharing on overall training incidence just misses 
significance at the 10 per cent level. 
 
6. DIRECT VS. INDIRECT EFFECTS - THE ROLE OF SEPARATIONS 
 
As discussed, Azfar and Danninger (2001) argue that profit sharing increases the receipt of 
training by reducing the likelihood of separation, increasing the amortization period for 
investment and so making a larger share of training investments profitable.  At the same time 
profit sharing may directly influence training receipt by alleviating the hold up problem in 
training and by increasing the willingness of coworkers to provide training.  In this subsection we 
allow for the possibility of both direct and indirect effects. We investigate this by creating an 
instrument for the risk of separation and including it as a regressor in a 2SLS estimation of 
training incidence.
6 In both the instrumental equation on separation risk and in the training 
incidence equation profit sharing stands as a critical variable of interest. The combination of a 
significant role for profit sharing in the instrumental estimation of separation risk and a role for 
the instrumented separation risk variable in training incidence would indicate an indirect effect of 
profit sharing.  A significant role for profit sharing in the second stage estimation of training 
                                                 
5 Again this strategy may introduce sample selection bias into our estimates. We re-estimated all the models reported 
in table 6 by linear probability model with fixed effects. This produced similar estimates of the effect of profit 
sharing/bonuses and performance pay on the incidence of training. 
6 See Wooldridge (2002: 623-625) for a defense of using such a methodology even when using limited dependent 
variables.    14
would indicate a direct role.  The ability to distinguish between these direct and indirect effects 
depends upon the success of the instrumental variable approach.  
The identification of our instrument exploits a long recognized association between 
cigarette smoking and risk preference. Thus, Hersch and Viscusi (1990) and Hersch and Pickton 
(1995) use cigarette smoking to proxy individuals with greater risk preference.  Experiments 
confirm this association by asking participants to engage in experimental lotteries designed to 
measure their risk aversion. At the conclusion of the experiment Barsky et al. (1997) found that 
those who undertook the larger risks in the laboratory were significantly more likely to smoke.  
Critically cigarette smoking has been correlated with important labor market choices.  Viscusi 
and Hersch (2001) demonstrate that US workers who smoke take substantially more risky jobs 
(in terms of injuries on the jobs).  In the UK Brown et al. (2006) show that smokers are more 
likely to accept jobs with greater earnings and employment risk.  The critical point we apply from 
this literature is that smokers can be expected to receive less disutility from a given risk of job 
separation.  As a consequence, in a hedonic labor market, we anticipate that workers that smoke 
will sort into jobs with higher expected separation risks all else equal. 
At the same time that our identification scheme requires a variable that strongly 
determines a workers separation risk, that same variable should not influence the incidence of 
training itself.  While some forms of training may be more risky than others, there is nothing 
about the association between smoking and risk that we think should influence the decision 
whether or not to undertake training itself.  Statistically, the number of cigarettes smoked daily 
appears to be a highly satisfactory instrument insofar as it is statistically significant in the 
separation equation (T-Stat = 5.13), unrelated to any of the measures of training incidence (an 
average T-Stat of 0.11), and test statistics (F-Test = 135.86) are well above the critical values    15
outlined by Stock and Yogo (2005) to detect weak instruments. We experimented with another 
instrumental variable that met the same statistical criteria, whether the individual reported having 
a poor financial situation.  We included this in estimates both in conjunction with the number of 
cigarettes smoked and in estimations where the smoking variable was omitted. In none of the 
training models did this materially affect the magnitude or sign of the profit sharing or 
performance pay effects on training incidence. 
Estimates from the 2SLS model are reported as Table 7. The addition of the smoking 
variable does not change the important role that profit sharing plays as a negative determinant of 
probability of job separation. Thus, the indirect effect will be confirmed if the predicted 
probability of separation influences training. 
Two critical observations emerge from Table 7.  First, the predicted probability of 
separation never takes a statistically significant coefficient. Indeed, it is worth nothing in passing 
that if one ignores the proper instrumenting of the separation probability and simply includes 
separation as a normal regressor, it often takes not only positive a positive coefficient but one 
statistically significant from zero.
7  Thus, even though profit sharing lowers the rate of 
separation, the lowered rate of separation plays no role in increasing training.  In short, we find 
no support for the indirect path of causation.  Second, despite the addition of the estimated 
probability of separation, the role of profit sharing on training remains in the second stage 
estimates presented in Table 7.  Profit sharing takes a significantly positive coefficient in all four 
estimates for the different types of training and thus appears to have a strong and robust direct 
influence on training.  
It might be thought that our estimation is missing the critical role played by separation 
because of the range of tenures in our sample.  Specifically, most separations may happen early 
                                                 
7 Similar results are reported by Bassanini et al (2005) using the European Community Household Panel.    16
in a workers' tenure and it is also at this time that most training is undertaken (Greenhalgh and 
Marvotas 1996).  Thus, our estimations might fail to uncover the true negative influence of the 
separation probability on training that happens throughout most of a worker's later tenure.  To test 
this we re-estimate our model in Table 8 eliminating all workers within their first two years of 
tenure.  While the point estimates move modestly, the direct effect of profit sharing remains 
strongly confirmed and there is no significant role for the estimated separation probability. We 
went further eliminating all of those with less than five years and than all of those with less than 
ten years.  Neither set of estimations show the predicted negative influence of the estimated 
probability of separation and both strongly confirm the continuing direct role of profit sharing.   
Furthermore, the 2SLS estimates of profit shares effects on training reported in tables 7 
and 8 are robust to a number of additional tests and specifications. First, estimating the impact of 
separation within the next year on training is an arbitrary time interval. We estimated additional 
models using separation within the next 2 years and next 3 years, respectively. In no case did this 
markedly affect the point estimates of profit shares effect on training incidence or reveal an 
indirect effect. Second, separation may represent too coarse a turnover variable. Instead risk of 
employer initiated separations (fires) may be more likely to effect employers’ decisions on who 
to train (especially in firm specific skills). We re-estimated the models in table 7 using fires 
instead of separations, again the point estimates of profit shares on training remain essentially 
unchanged.  
In addition, we estimate separate 2SLS models of training incidence for two sub-groups 
where there is an expectation of longer term employment relationships, unionised workers and 
permanent (i.e. non-temporary) workers. For both groups we expect longer expected duration of 
employment and, as a result, less potential for profit sharing effects on training to be a result of    17
its indirect influence on turnover. Conversely, temporary workers and non-unionised workers 
should have relatively lower expected tenure, suggesting greater scope for indirect effect through 
separation.  We estimate the 2SLS models of training incidence for non-unionised workers (there 
are too few observations to estimate a model for temporary workers alone). For permanent 
workers, the estimates of profit sharing effects on training are essentially unchanged to those 
reported in table 5. For unionized workers, estimated profit sharing effects are marginally higher 
than those in table 5 (marginal effects = 0.047 [0.018]). In neither case is there any evidence of 
an indirect effect of profit sharing on training through reduced separation risk.  Estimates for the 
non-unionised sub-sample indicate a marginally lower direct effect (although still statistically 
significant) of profit sharing on training, but still no effect of separation risk on training 
incidence. Taken together, these estimates provide a further indication that the observed effect of 
profit sharing on training is being driven by a direct effect rather than indirectly through lower 
separation rates. 
In an alternative robustness check, we examine the joint estimation of separation risk and 
training recognizing that common unobservable factors may influence both contemporaneous 
separation risk and training incidence. We estimate bivariate probit models (Zellner and Lee, 
1965) which account for common errors and report the results in Table 9. Again we use number 
of cigarettes as the identifying variable. Indeed, unobservable individual level factors that 
increase separation risk are also associated with higher levels of training incidence. Yet, the 
presence of this association this does not fundamentally change the estimated effect of profit 
shares on the overall incidence of training or of its subcomponents.  
 
    18
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Previous research demonstrates the link between the use of profit sharing schemes and increased 
profitability, labour productivity and worker wages.  However, relatively little is understood 
about how profit sharing increases worker productivity.  This paper investigated one particular 
channel, the effect of profit sharing on worker training. In particular, we distinguish between the 
direct effect of profit sharing on training through creating a contract that rewards training and/or 
encouraging co-workers to provide training, and the potential indirect effect through reduced 
separations and hence longer expected amortization period.  
As a first step we use UK data to demonstrate that profit sharing is associated with lower 
separation rates. In turn, we demonstrate a positive, direct and statistically significant effect of 
profit sharing on the provision of worker training.  This is true of overall training incidence and 
intensity, but also for sub-categories of training such as employer-funded, specific and general 
training. These results are robust to the inclusion of controls for individual fixed effects, 
simultaneity of training and separation, and remain once we attempt to control for the effect that 
profit sharing has on reducing the likelihood of future separation from the firm.   
More generally, these direct effects on training are also present for other performance 
related pay. However, unlike performance related pay schemes that directly reward individual 
productivity, profit sharing may also increase informal and on-the-job training provision by co-
workers. We present evidence that profit sharing does indeed increase the provision of informal 
on the job training, and that no such effect is present for direct performance related pay.  
Together, our results suggest that profit sharing changes employer-worker relations in a 
way that leads to greater formal and informal investment in worker skills. We argue that this is    19
one likely source of the previously demonstrated worker productivity enhancing effect of profit 
sharing arrangements.  We emphasize that we found no evidence that profit sharing has an 
indirect influence on training through its role in reducing turnover.  
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TABLE 1 Summary Statistics, Male Non-Public Sector Employees Aged 20-65 
  BHPS 1998-2004  LFS 1999-2004 
Variables  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
Profit Sharing/Bonuses  0.426       
Performance Pay  0.188       
Piece Rate/Tips      0.008   
Profit Shares      0.015   
Bonuses     0.083   
Compensatory Wages      0.075   
Other Additional Payments      0.039   
Age (years)  37.921  11.134  40.450  11.952 
Tenure (years)  11.540  7.433     
Tenure: 0-3 months          
3-6 months      0.110   
6-12 months      0.219   
1 – 2yrs      0.161   
2 – 5 yrs      0.219   
5 – 10 yrs      0.161   
10 yrs +      0.341   
Married 0.581    0.640   
Highest Level of Education:         
< A-Level  0.526    0.511   
A-Level 0.237    0.272   
Diploma/Vocational* 0.089    0.096   
Degree 0.119    0.143   
Higher Degree  0.029    -   
Log Pay (£1996)  6.482  1.026  5.506  0.636 
Normal Hours Worked  40.040  6.923  42.980  12.354 
Union Member  0.219       
Temporary Job  0.032    0.038   
Firm Size: 1-24 workers         
25-99 workers  0.256       
100-499 workers  0.267       
500 workers plus  0.161       
Observations 14047    40269   
Source: BHPS, LFS  
TABLE 2 Turnover Estimates – Marginal Effects, Male Non-Public Sector Employees Aged 20-65, 1998-2004, BHPS. 
 
 Separations  Quits  Fires  Redundancies 
  Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err Coeff  Std.Err  Coeff  Std.Err 
Profit Share/Bonus  -0.041*  0.007  -0.016*  0.004  -0.006  0.003  -0.004  0.003 
Performance Pay  0.005  0.008  0.003  0.096  -0.007  0.004  -0.004  0.004 
Age 0.001  0.002  0.0002  0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001 
Age
2 -0.0001  0.0002  -0.00003*  0.00001  0.00002  0.00001  0.00001  0.00001 
Tenure -0.005*  0.0004  -0.002*  0.0002  -0.001*  0.0002  -0.001*  0.0002 
Married -0.013  0.008  0.003  0.005  -0.007**  0.003  -0.007**  0.003 
A-Level   0.020**  0.009  0.009  0.005  -0.0001  0.004  -0.0001  0.004 
Diploma 0.030**  0.013  0.021*  0.008  -0.013**  0.006  -0.012**  0.006 
Degree or Higher  0.028**  0.011  0.028*  0.007  -0.019*  0.007  -0.017*  0.006 
Log Weekly Wage  -0.009**  0.004  -0.008*  0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.0003  0.002 
Normal Hours  0.001**  0.0004  0.001*  0.0002  -0.0001  0.0002  -0.0001  0.0002 
Union -0.051*  0.009  -0.020*  0.006  -0.012*  0.004  -0.011**  0.004 
Temporary Worker  0.165*  0.017  0.031*  0.010  0.017**  0.008  0.017**  0.007 
Firm Size 50-99  0.010  0.009  0.006  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004 
Firm Size 100 to 500  -0.013  0.009  -0.006  0.006  -0.002  0.004  -0.001  0.004 
Firm Size 500+  -0.001  0.001  -0.010  0.007  -0.004  0.005  -0.003  0.005 
Constant -0.132    -0.107    -0.093    -0.100   
Pseudo r
2 0.053    0.074    0.035    0.033   
Observations 14047           
Source: BHPS. *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Controls included but not reported: year, industry, occupation and 
region controls.  Standard errors clustered at the individual level.     1
TABLE 3 Turnover Estimates - Marginal Effects, Male Non-Public Sector Employees Aged 20-65, 1999-2004, LFS 
 Separations  Quits  Fires  Redundancies 
  Coeff. Std.Err Coeff.  Std.Err  Coeff  Std.Err  Coeff  Std.Err 
Profit Share  -0.029**  0.013  -0.009  0.009  -0.015  0.008  -0.020**  0.009 
Performance Pay   0.010  0.015  0.009  0.009  -0.007  0.009  -0.005  0.011 
Bonus 0.009  0.005  0.003  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.003 
Compensatory Pay  -0.015*  0.006  -0.011*  0.004  0.001  0.003  -0.004  0.004 
Other Bonus  0.009  0.007  0.005  0.005  0.008**  0.004  0.004  0.005 
Age 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.0004  0.004  0.002*  0.0005 
Age
2 -0.00003*  0.00001  -0.0002*  0.000006  -0.00005  0.00005  -0.00001**  0.000006 
Log Weekly Wage  -0.010*  0.003  -0.008*  0.002  0.0001  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Hours 0.001*  0.0001  0.0002*  0.00008  0.0002**  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
Tenure: 3-6 months  -0.028*  0.007  -0.018*  0.005  -0.007**  0.003  -0.002  0.005 
6-12 months  -0.033*  0.006  -0.014*  0.004  -0.014*  0.003  -0.008  0.005 
1 – 2yrs  -0.048*  0.006  -0.023*  0.004  -0.016*  0.003  -0.010**  0.004 
2 – 5 yrs  -0.076*  0.006  -0.030*  0.004  -0.024*  0.003  -0.016*  0.004 
5 – 10 yrs  -0.104*  0.006  -0.049*  0.004  -0.024*  0.003  -0.017*  0.004 
10 yrs+  -0.146*  0.006  -0.071*  0.004  -0.032*  0.058  -0.023*  0.004 
Married 0.010*  0.003  0.005**  0.002  0.001  0.032  -0.007*  0.002 
A-Level 0.003  0.005  0.001  0.003  0.003  0.003  -0.002  0.003 
Voc/Diploma 0.008**  0.004  0.042  0.029  -0.001  0.003  -0.001  0.002 
Degree or higher  -0.008**  0.004  -0.116*  0.040  -0.001  0.003  -0.001  0.003 
Temporary Worker  0.050*  0.006  0.006  0.050  0.040*  0.003  0.014*  0.004 
Constant -0.095    -0.067    -0.109    -0.185   
Pseudo r
2 0.072    0.073    0.053    0.017   
Observations 40269               
Source: LFS. *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Controls included but not reported: year, industry, occupation, region 
and ethnicity controls.  Robust standard errors.  
 
 
1    2
 
TABLE 4 Fixed Effects Estimates of Payment Method Effects on Separation (Average Effects), 
Male Non-Public Sector Employees Aged 20-65. 
 
 Fixed  Effects 
  Coeff. Std.Err 
Profit Share/Bonus    -0.809*  0.078 
Performance Pay  0.199** 0.093 
Observations 5,963  
Source: BHPS. *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Controls included but not 
reported: year, industry, occupation and region controls.   
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Trained?  Employer Funded Training  Specific Training  General Training 
Incidence (marginal effects)  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err 
Profit Share/Bonus  0.038*  0.008  0.036*  0.007  0.041*  0.008  0.037*  0.008 
Performance Pay  0.034*  0.011  0.017**  0.008  0.031*  0.010  0.032*  0.011 
        
Intensity (hours)  Training Time  Employer Funded Training  Specific Training  
 
General Training  
  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err 
Profit Share/Bonus  2.074*  0.661  2.668**    1.213    2.025  1.599    3.387**  1.444 
Performance Pay  2.568*  0.750  0.087  1.519  0.207  2.003  0.176  1.809 
Observations 14047               
Source: BHPS. *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Controls included but not reported: year, industry, occupation and 
region controls.   
 









TABLE 6 Fixed Effects Estimates of Training Incidence (Average Effects), Male Non-Public Sector Employees Aged 20-65. 
 
 Trained?  Employer Funded 
Training 
Specific Training  General Training 
  Coeff.  Std.Err Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err 
Profit  Share/Bonus  0.105 0.069  0.241* 0.077  0.200*  0.072  0.146**  0.071 
Performance  Pay  0.134 0.080 0.083 0.089  0.155  0.082  0.153  0.082 
Observations  7043   5633   6501    6692   
 
Source: BHPS *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 IV Estimates of Payment Method on Training, Male Non-Public Sector Employees Aged 20-65.  
  Trained?  Employer Funded Training  Specific Training  General Training 
  Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err 
Separation  -0.039  0.100  0.012  0.087 -0.021  0.097 -0.027  0.094 
Profit  Share/Bonus  0.033*  0.011  0.036*  0.010 0.034*  0.011 0.038*  0.011 
Performance  Pay  0.039*  0.010  0.021**  0.009 0.038*  0.009 0.038*  0.010 
Observations 14047               
 
Source: BHPS *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
Controls included but not reported: year, industry, occupation and region controls.      25
 
TABLE 8 IV Estimates of the Effect of Payment Method on Training Incidence by Tenure 
Bands, Male Non-Public Sector Employees Aged 20-65, 1997-2004, BHPS. 
 
 
Trained? Employer  Funded 
Training 
Specific Training  General Training 
Tenure > 2 yrs  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err 
Separation  -0.109  0.174 0.038 0.150  -0.078  0.164 -0.048  0.168 
Profit Share/Bonus  0.029  0.016  0.039*  0.014  0.035**  0.015  0.033**  0.016 
Performance Pay  0.041*  0.011  0.021**  0.009  0.039*  0.011  0.038*  0.011 
Observations  13069             
  Tenure > 5 yrs 
 
  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err 
Separation  0.134  0.160 0.015 0.138  0.117  0.151  0.151  0.156 
Profit Share/Bonus  0.049*  0.016  0.038*  0.011  0.053*  0.015  0.050*  0.016 
Performance  Pay  0.037*  0.012 0.016 0.011  0.038*  0.012 0.035*  0.012 
Observations  9972             
  Tenure >10 yrs 
 
  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err  Beta   
Separation  0.223  0.203 0.105 0.175  0.218  0.192  0.215  0.197 
Profit Share/Bonus  0.057*  0.018  0.045*  0.015  0.059*  0.017  0.055*  0.017 
Performance  Pay  0.021  0.014 0.002 0.012  0.020  0.014  0.035**  0.014 
Observations  6817             
Source: BHPS *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
Controls included but not reported: year, industry, occupation and region controls.    
 
TABLE 9 Bivariate Probit Estimates of Profit Share Effects on Training and Separation, Male Non-Public Sector Employees Aged 
20-65 
 
  Trained?  Employer Funded Training  Specific Training  General Training 
  Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err 
Profit Share/Bonus  0.084*  0.029  0.066**  0.032  0.085*  0.030  0.078*  0.030 
Performance pay  0.062  0.038  0.059**  0.039  0.064  0.038  0.062*  0.037 
                
 Separation 
Profit Share/Bonus  -0.161*  0.029  -0.162*  0.029  -0.162*  0.029  -0.162*  0.029 
Performance pay  0.034  0.036  0.034  0.037  0.034  0.037  0.034  0.037 
Number Cigs  0.005*  0.001  0.005*  0.002  0.005*  0.002  0.005*  0.002 
Rho    0.045**  0.019  0.012  0.020  0.007  0.019  0.045**  0.019 
Observations 12842              
 
Source: BHPS *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 








TABLE A1 Turnover Estimates Omitting Tenure, Male Non-Public Sector Employees Aged 20-65 
 
  Separations Quits  Fires  Redundancies 
BHPS  Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err Coeff.  Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err 
Profit Share/Bonus  -0.393* 0.030  -0.145*  0.035  -0.088**  0.045 -0.071  0.046 
Performance Pay  0.124* 0.035  0.032 0.045  -0.086  0.059  -0.057  0.060 
                
LFS   Coeff. Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err Coeff.  Std.Err  Coeff.  Std.Err 
Performance Pay   0.056 0.096  0.096  0.115  -0.137  0.170  -0.064 0.146 
Profit Share  -0.239* 0.085  -0.164 0.107  -0.306**  0.147 -0.284**  0.123 
Bonus  0.047 0.032  0.030  0.041  0.063  0.048  0.039 0.043 
Compensatory Pay  -0.171* 0.037  -0.201*  0.048  -0.030  0.052 -0.073  0.046 
Other Bonus  0.051 0.047  0.059  0.060  0.137**  0.067  0.054 0.062 
 
Source: BHPS *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 






Appendix A2 Training Incidence, LFS, Marginal Effects 
LFS  Trained in last 13 weeks? 
 
On the Job Training in Last 4 weeks?* 
 
Beta  Std Err  Beta  Std Err 
Performance Pay   -0.001 0.025  -0.007  0.014 
Profit Share  0.092* 0.019  0.044*  0.013 
Bonus  0.033* 0.008  0.009  0.005 
Compensatory Pay  0.090 0.009  0.044*  0.006 
Other Bonus  0.053* 0.012  0.002  0.007 
Observations  40269      
* "On the job training" means learning by example and practice while actually doing the 
job. Any training conducted in a classroom or training section, even if on the employers premises is not 
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